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CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS-CooPERATION IN PREPA• 
RATION OF NEWS .ARTICLES AS ADVERTISING IN VIOLATION OF CANON 27-
Two recent decisions were the first to construe the prohibition against in-
direct advertising embodied in Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional 
Ethics.1 Although the facts and issues involved were substantially alike, the 
holdings were divergent. 
At the request of a local Miami newspaper, respondent submitted to 
an interview which formed the basis of a full page article in the "Sunday 
Supplement."2 The article see forth a complimentary biography of respon-
dent and described the internal workings of his firm. Respondent was found 
guilty of violating Canon 273 by the Grievance Committee of the Florida 
State Bar Association. The recommendation was modified from private to 
public reprimand by the Board of Governors. On review, held, recom-
mendation quashed and complaint dismissed, one judge concurring spe-
1 Canon 27 is identical in both jurisdictions. See notes 3, 5 infra. Its material 
passage is as follows: "Advertising, Direct or Indirect-It is unprofessional to solicit pro-
fessional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal com-
munications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisement 
for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or 
procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer 
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the 
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehen-
sible; but the customary use of simple professional cards is not improper." AMERICAN BAR 
AssocIAUON, CANONS OF PROF'ESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 19 (1957). 
2 Miami News, Dec. 13, 1959. 
3 Fla. Code of Ethics, Rule B(l), 31 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 21, n-27 (Supp. 1962). 
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cially, one judge dissenting. Furnishing information at the instigation of 
a newspaper for a newsworthy article not offensively self-laudatory is not 
indirect advertising in violation of Canon 27. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. 
Nichols, 151 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1963). 
A national magazine contacted respondents regarding a proposed article 
on the practice of corporate law in New York City. Respondents submitted 
to interviews and posed for photographs. The article,4 published after ap-
proval by respondents, described the complexity of corporate law by ref-
erence to the firm's activities. The referee found respondents guilty of 
professional misconduct and of violating Canons 27 and 29.5 On a motion 
to confirm, held, confirmed and respondents censured, one judge dissenting. 
Compliance with requests for assistance in the preparation of an objec-
tionably laudatory magazine article and approval of the publication thereof 
is indirect advertising in violation of Canons 27 and 29 and thus profes-
sional misconduct.6 In Te Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 
(1963). 
Canon 27 is designed to prohibit attorneys from having contact with 
the public which might tend to promote their professional employment.7 
It is not limited to direct paid advertising and "ambulance chasing," but 
expressly extends to "indirect advertisement . . . such as furnishing or in-
spiring newspaper comments ... .''8 The numerous cases interpreting Canon 
27° have nearly all involved situations in which the attorney himself in-
stigated the prohibited activity. Those few cases which have dealt with 
uninstigated advertising have usually involved certain organizations which 
provide legal services for their members. For example, railroad unions have 
undertaken to refer injured railroadmen to particular lawyers, and this 
practice has been unanimously condemned under the Canons.10 Similar un-
instigated advertising incident to the legal aid programs of automobile 
clubs11 and seamen's associations12 has also met with disapproval. An ex-
4 Life, March 9, 1962, p. 80. Life responded to the decision reported herein with 
a critical editorial. Life, May 31, 1963, p. 4. In rebuttal, see 49 A.B.A.J. 752 (1963). 
r; N.Y. Canons of Professional Ethics, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 315 (Supp. 1963). 
6 The term "professional misconduct" of attorneys includes violations of the Canons 
of Ethics. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 90 provides sanctions for such misconduct. 
7 For the history and policies underlying Canon 27, see generally DRINKER, LEGAL 
ETHICS 210-15 (1953); Comment, 25 u. Cm. L. REv. 674 (1958). 
8 See note 1 supra. 
o See generally Annot. 39 A.L.R.2d 1055 (1955); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 401 (1931). 
10 See In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 
2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 
N.E.2d 163 (1958); In re FisclI, 269 App. Div. 74, 54 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1945). But see Ryan v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932), where the court upheld an attorney's lien on 
a judgment recovered by a referral plan client. 
11 See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N.E. 
1 (1935); In the Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); 
Weihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs-Useful But Forbidden, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 296 
(1936). 
12 See In re Axtell, 229 App. Div. 323, 242 N.Y.S. 18 (1930), afj'd as to guilt, 257 N.Y. 
210, 177 N.E. 423 (1931), modified as to discipline, 235 App. Div. 350, 257 N.Y.S. 470 (1932). 
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ception to this general condemnation of referral programs, however, was 
established by the Supreme Court's recent decision disapproving the ap-
plication of Canon 27 to promotion by the NAACP of civil rights suits.13 
The Court distinguished between advertising which promotes litigation of 
constitutional rights and advertising which promotes "use of the legal 
process for purely private gain. . . ."14 A similar exception is implicit in 
Canon 35; although it prohibits using an organization as an intermediary 
between an attorney and his client, it makes an exception for charitable 
societies rendering aid to indigents and thus condones some referral plans.15 
It should be noted, however, that the uninstigated advertising in both the 
condemned plans and the approved exceptions is direct advertising; its 
main purpose and natural tendency is to place potential clients in contact 
with attorneys. It seems clear that the presence or absence of instigation by 
the attorney fails to provide a useful criterion for determining whether a 
particular kind of direct advertising is condemned by Canon 27. The im-
propriety of direct advertising, and the financial harm it causes fellow 
attorneys, is the same whether the publisher comes to the attorney or the 
attorney goes to the publisher. Furthermore, if uninstigated direct adver-
tising were permitted, its present minor frequency would probably increase 
sharply. 
The principal cases, on the other hand, involved indirect advertising, 
in that any benefit accruing to the attorneys was incidental to the nature 
and primary purpose of the publications. In the realm of indirect unpaid ad-
vertising a distinction based on instigation might provide a sensible basis 
for permitting the publication of some tasteful and informative articles. 
The terminology of Canon 27 supports such a construction,16 and the fre-
quency of unpaid articles is not likely to be great in any event. The in-
frequency and the indirect nature of the advertising in these articles mini-
mize their harmful effect on other attorneys, and the instances that do 
occur will generally indicate particular newsworthiness or well-merited 
praise.17 This distinction based on instigation was given some weight in 
13 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
14 Id. at 443. See also cases cited, id. at 440 n.19; ABA, OPINIONS OF THE CoMMITrEE 
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 308 (1957), Opinion No. 148 (1935) (permitting advertising which 
promoted litigation of the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act). 
15 ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 33 (1957). Opinions of the 
American Bar Association Ethics Committee indicate, however, that advertising for such 
lawyer referral services must be carried on through a bar association. Compare ABA, 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1957) Opinion No. 191 (1939), at p. 377, 
with id., Opinion No. 205 (1940), at p. 416. See also id., Opinion No. 291 (1956), at p. 624. 
16 See note 1 supra. The canon refers to "furnishing or inspiring," and "procuring." 
The words "inspiring" and "procuring" clearly seem to demand an element of instiga-
tion. The context of "furnishing"-"furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments"-
clearly conjoins it with terms demanding an element of instigation; this would indicate 
that it was most likely designed to prevent an attorney from sending a fully prepared 
manuscript to a publisher on his own. It must be conceded, however, that the sentence 
of Canon 27 which deals with indirect advertising is confusing and grammatically unclear, 
making it capable of varying interpretations. 
17 In this connection it is interesting to note that prior to 1940, Canon 27 began: 
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Nichols, where it was emphasized that "the newspapers voluntarily solic-
ited the material for the article as a news story only; respondent solicited 
nothing .•.. "18 However, this distinction was apparently rejected in Con-
nelly, that court choosing to stress that respondents had furnished the 
material and cooperated throughout in the preparation of the article.19 In 
any event, it seems clear that the cases which refuse to recognize the in-
stigation distinction when direct advertising is involved are not persuasive 
authority for a similar refusal when dealing with indirect advertising.20 
Although previous case law is not very helpful in resolving the problem 
of the principal cases, a number of opinions by the grievance and ethics 
committees of various bar associations are more in point. Their technical 
status as authority is unclear,21 but they are generally cited at length in 
attorney misconduct cases, and were relied on heavily in both principal 
cases. Opinions are reported only sporadically, and, to prevent identifica-
tion of, or embarrassment to, the parties involved, the facts giving rise to 
them are not reported. These opinions nonetheless embody the careful 
deliberations of prominent lawyers in close contact with the customary 
practices and realistic needs of the profession. 
In 1932 the American Bar Association's Committee on Professional 
Ethics responded to the following hypothethical situation: without any 
instigation by the attorney in question, the local newspaper repeatedly 
published a notice of his arrival in town accompanied by the statement 
that he was "one of the leading trial lawyers in the state." Expressing doubt 
that such a situation could actually arise, the Committee held that such 
conduct would be laudatory indirect advertising in violation of Canon 27.22 
The Committee stated it to be the duty of the lawyer when he was first 
made aware of the publication to "request and require" its discontinuance. 
The same duty would arise if the lawyer learned of the article prior to in• 
itial publication.23 The further determination of the Committee, that the 
"the most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and 
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for 
professional capacity and fidelity to trust." See DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 215. 
18 State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Nichols, 151 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1963). 
19 In re Connelly, 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 470-71, 240 N.Y .S.2d 126, 130-31 (1963). 
20 These two variables, instigation by the attorney and directness of the benefit ac-
cruing from publication, allow a breakdown of all advertising into four categories: in-
stigated-direct, instigated-indirect, uninstigated-direct, and uninstigated-indirect. It is 
suggested that, judged by frequency of occurrence and degree of detrimental effect, the 
above categories arc arranged in descending order of objectionability, and that the prin-
cipal cases fall within the fourth category. 
21 The Opinions of the American Bar Ass'n Committee are said to be "highly per-
suasive" but not binding on state and local committees. DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 7, 
at 32. 
22 ABA, OPINIONS OF THE CoMMITIEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 157 (1957), Opinion No. 
62 (1932). 
23 See also Opinion No. 79, reported in Appendix A of DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 7 
as "Decisions by the ABA Ethics Committee Hitherto Unreported." This opinion held 
that a law firm "may not acquiesce in the publication by a magazine of a laudatory 
history of the firm." 
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publication in issue would be impermissibly laudatory, is also relevant. The 
articles in the principal cases, both of which contained extensive biog-
raphies and praised the attorneys in several specific respects, seem more 
delinquent on this account than the rather mild statement in the foregoing 
hypothetical case. 
Two possibilities of avoiding the sanctions of Canon 27 when they 
would otherwise apply are set out in Opinion 806 of the Committee on 
Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.24 
This opinion was relied on in the Connelly case25 and cited by the dissent 
in Nichols.26 The opinion held that a lawyer may not encourage or col-
laborate in the preparation of laudatory newspaper and magazine state-
ments; however, in light of the substantial public interest in legitimately 
newsworthy activities of a lawyer, he may answer questions and volunteer 
data if he insists that the article be in good taste.27 Thus, a finding of 
newsworthiness and good taste will excuse encouraging or collaborating 
in a publication even though such action is otherwise objectionable under 
Canon 27. Determining what is newsworthy or in good taste is, of course, a 
question which depends upon the facts and circumstances of a given case, 
and upon the personal judgment of the particular court or ethics com-
mittee. Due to the lack of precision in the standards that must be applied, 
as well as the uniqueness of each situation, it is difficult to say that the 
principal cases, or any other cases which might arise involving the same 
problem, are inconsistent with one another. In addition, although questions 
of newsworthiness and objectionable laudation are subject to review by 
grievance committees and courts, such review comes only after the harm 
has been done, and there is thus an understandable reluctance to impose 
harsh penalties for mere mistakes of judgment. Such reluctance played a 
key role in the Nichols case.28 Moreover, even though an attorney may try 
in good faith to comply with Canon 27, his personal and financial involve-
ment will usually prevent him from making an objective and intelligent 
judgment.29 Therefore, the result of relying solely on review that follows 
publication is a leniency of enforcement which benefits the aggressive at-
torney with the lowest standard of good taste at the expense of his more 
timid or conscientious colleagues. Consequently, providing only for review 
24 THE WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITI'EE ON PRO· 
FESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AsSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. AND THE 
NEW YORK. COUNTY LAWYERS' AssoCIATION 543 (1956), Opinion No. 806 (1955). 
25 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126, 138 (1963). 
26 151 So. 2d 257, 266-67 (1963). 
27 Accord, DRINKER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 260: "In the ultimate analysis the ques-
tion, like many of those involving legal ethics, is one of good faith and good taste." 
28 See 151 So. 2d 257, 261-62 (Fla. 1963). 
29 But see DRINKER, op. dt. supra note 7, at 218-19: "[A]ctually, a lawyer soundly 
brought up in the law, who wholeheartedly accepts his professional status, will rarely have 
any difficulty in realizing the difference between the normal by-product of efficient service 
and the unwholesome results of self-aggrandizement." 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1963). 
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following publication can not be deemed a satisfactory method of applying 
a canon of ethics. 
Existing bar association ethics committees, however, provide ready-
made machinery for solving this dilemma. Requiring that all articles be 
edited and approved by such committees before they are published would 
permit a more exacting application of the standards of newsworthiness, 
good taste, and objectionable laudation. Indeed, as a result of having to 
apply these standards constantly, the committees would in time establish 
fairly definite and precise meanings for these presently amorphous con-
cepts. In order to comply with such a plan of pre-publication editing, an 
attorney would have to obtain contractual editing rights prior to submitting 
to an interview or furnishing information for an article. Compliance with 
this proposed procedure, however, would relieve an attorney of responsibil-
ity even though the publisher later refused to comply with the Committee's 
recommendations.30 An attorney engaged in particularly newsworthy ac-
tivities, where even slight procedural delay would be detrimental,31 could 
be exempted from the requirement of obtaining pre-publication approval 
in carefully delimited subject areas if the committee were satisfied that his 
judgment could be trusted.32 Such attorneys could, of course, be proceeded 
against later if they violated Canon 27 and the terms of such prior approval. 
The purpose of this proposed plan of pre-publication editing is to 
provide greater contact between attorneys and the general public, rather 
than to bury what little exists under administrative red tape. The con-
tinued poor public image of both lawyers and the practice of law33 is a 
direct result of the restricted means of communication presently available, 
and it evidences a pressing need for improvement. The unsolicited pub-
lication of articles describing newsworthy activities and careers of members 
of the bar is a far more effective means of improving this public image than 
are spot advertisements by trust companies and bar associations.34 Overly 
zealous condemnation of indirect uninstigated advertising may deprive the 
public of the opportunity to understand and evaluate our legal system. It 
30 Specific enforcement of such an editing contract might encounter first amendment 
objections. However, prohibiting future cooperation with breaching publishers would 
provide an effective non-judicial sanction. 
31 The activity of the New York attorney who negotiated the release of Cuban in-
vasion prisoners in early 1963 would be an example of the situation envisioned here. 
32 This exemption is necessary because two-and-one-half months is the average time 
presently required by the American Bar Association Ethics Committee to process and 
respond to inquiries. The average for state and local committees is perhaps somewhat less 
due to the proximity of committee members. Procedural improvements could probably 
be made, but present procedures would be satisfactory for articles, like those involved in 
both principal cases, which are of a casual rather than an urgent nature. 
33 See Eldred, Public Relations for Lawyers, 22 Ky, S.B.J. 170 (1958); Hamley, Public 
Relations and the Individual Lawyer, 41 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 70 (1957). 
84 Bar association advertising has met with increasing approval in recent years. Com-
pare ABA, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS (1957), Opinion No. 121 (1934), at 
p. 252, with id., Opinion No. 227 (1941), at p. 454. See also id., Opinion No. 179 (1938), at 
p. 355; id., Opinion No. 260 (1944), at p. 537. 
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seems essential, therefore, that some procedure be set up which would 
prevent objectionable indirect advertising, and yet encourage and facilitate 
the publication of informative articles of genuine public interest. Present 
methods and practices under Canon 27 have proved themselves too re-
strictive. 
Joseph F. McDonald 
